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ABSTRACT
Spain’s financial position during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has
usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which
resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor
markets and this, in turn, slowed down the growth of the economy. In this
essay a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current
account allows us to reject this view. In fact, a net capital inflow made
possible to meet the demand for investment-boosting economic perfor-
mance. Current account reversals in a context of macroeconomic domestic
imperfections help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the
century.
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RESUMEN
La posicio´n financiera de Espan˜a durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX
y primer tercio del XX se caracterizo´, a juicio de algunos historiadores, por
un de´ficit persistente de la balanza de pagos por cuenta corriente, resultado
de la integracio´n espan˜ola en los mercados internacionales de bienes y
factores que, a su vez, contribuyo´ a frenar el crecimiento. En este ensayo,
una reconstruccio´n preliminar de la balanza de pagos por cuenta corriente
permite rechazar dicha interpretacio´n. En efecto, la entrada neta de capital
hizo posible satisfacer la demanda de inversio´n y estimular, ası´, la actividad
econo´mica. La reversio´n de la cuenta corriente en un contexto de imper-
fecciones macroecono´micas internas contribuye a explicar la desaceleracio´n
econo´mica de fines del siglo XIX.
Palabras clave: balanza de pagos, sudden stops, reversiones de la
cuenta corriente, ahorro, inversion, crecimiento, Espan˜a
1. INTRODUCTION
Spain’s financial position during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has
been frequently described as one of the persistent deficits on current account. It
is also widely accepted that this situation was a result of her integration into
international commodity and factor markets that contributed, in turn, to
slowing down Spanish economic growth and deepening the country’s back-
wardness. Such a depiction is not grounded in sound quantitative evidence, but
provides a set of challenging hypotheses for research and testing. In this paper,
a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account
allows the rejection of the pessimistic view that Spain’s international integra-
tion hindered the growth of the economy. On the contrary, the sustained deficit
on current account over 1850-1890 highlights the fact that net inflows of
foreign capital made possible to meet the demand for domestic investment
and, thus, boosted Spanish economic performance, while current account
reversals help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the century. The
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents current assessments of Spain’s
international position. Section 3 describes briefly the sources and procedures
employed in the reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account.
Section 4 examines its main trends and determinants from a «sudden stop»
perspective1. In Section 5, the implications for the growth of Spain’s financial
position are discussed and Section 6 is the conclusion.
1 A «sudden stop» can be defined as an unexpected and significant reduction in a country’s net
capital inflow.
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2. ASSESSMENTS OF SPAIN’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
For most historians, Spain’s position in the international economy during
the 19th and early 20th centuries is characterized by a chronic deficit on
current account2. This diagnosis stems from the official trade figures (Esta-
dı´stica del comercio exterior), which show a sustained negative commodity
trade balance, and from the scattered evidence about the gross inflow of
foreign capital into Spain3.
Spain’s trade balance experienced, according to Juan Sarda´ Dexeus (1948,
p. 277), a sustained deficit for long periods, while Gabriel Tortella (1974a,
p. 122) stressed that the trade balance was negative through the late 19th
century. The persistent deficit represented, in Jaime Vicens Vives’s (1959,
p. 631) view, a heavy burden that contributed to the economic failure of the
Restoration (1876-1923).
The view that a chronic trade balance deficit hindered the economic
growth still prevails in Spain’s historical literature. Supposedly, the current
account deficit would have set a limit on the growth of demand to which
supply had to adjust, leading to slower growth4. The acceptance of an
external constraint on growth caused by a structural balance of payments
deficit has major economic policy implications, as it would require protective
measures to limit imports and a floating exchange rate. Alfonso Herranz-
Lonca´n and Daniel Tirado (1996, p. 24) observed that the values of income
elasticities for imports and exports suggest the existence of a constraint
on Spain’s economic growth resulting from the trade balance5. Jose´
Marı´a Serrano Sanz (1997) estimated the theoretical growth rate for
the Spanish economy, which was compatible with the current account
2 Among the most recent references to the recurrent external deficit; cf. Tortella (1994);
Herranz-Lonca´n and Tirado (1996); Serrano Sanz (1997); Gutie´rrez et al. (1998); Cubel et al. (1998).
3 Since Sarda´ Dexeus’s (1948) classical study, the only estimate of the total volume of foreign
capital invested in Spain during the 19th century is that of Broder (1976). Foreign investment in railways
and mining have been estimated by Tedde (1978) and Harvey and Taylor (1987), respectively. Stone
(1999) has published figures for British portfolio investment in Spain between 1865 and 1914.
4 In the «external constraint to growth» argument proposed by Thirlwall (1979), under the
assumptions of international stability of relative prices and the absence of capital flows, the
potential growth — that is, the one compatible with balance of payments equilibrium — is defined
by the ratio of the growth rate of real exports to the income elasticity of imports.
5 It should be noted, however, that the elasticities estimated by Herranz-Lonca´n and Tirado
(1996) are seriously questionable due to the fact that, in line with Tena (1989), they use the volume
indices for imports and exports obtained from the official trade figures (Prados de la Escosura 1982)
instead of deflating the series at current prices (revised both for the under-registration of quantities,
including smuggled goods, and for errors in the official unit values) in Prados de la Escosura
(1986, 1988). These authors also use Tena’s (1989) foreign trade price indices, which were obtained
dividing the corrected current values in index form (Prados de la Escosura 1986) by the volume
indices for imports and exports derived from the official trade statistics (Prados de la Escosura
1982). Thus, the implicit price (unit value) indices used are totally meaningless (especially in the
case of imports), as they include adjustments in the quantities traded in the numerator, but not in
the denominator.
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equilibrium6. As long as the theoretical rate is above the actual one, there is
no problem. This would have been the case of Spain over 1869-1891. How-
ever, if it is below, as it would have happened during 1892-1935, the external
sector would have hindered the long-run growth7. Recently, Oscar Bajo-
Rubio (2009), in a long-run view of Spain’s external sector, reaches quite a
different conclusion — an external restriction on growth, resulting from a
potentially unsustainable trade deficit, would only appear in phases of
exceptionally high growth.
Thirlwall’s (1979) «external constraint on growth» is, however, predicated
under the assumption that the terms of trade are stable and international
capital flows are negligible. In the context of the early globalization (1850-
1913), such an assumption is far fetched. Intense international commodity
and factor flows took place while the terms of trade suffered dramatic changes
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004; Blattman et al.
2007). In fact, the proponents of the «external constraint on growth» view
accept that in the presence of a sustained current account deficit financed
through capital inflows, their prediction of the long-term growth rate is
inadequate and the restriction on growth would result from the pace and size
of foreign investment (Thirlwall and Hussain 1982, p. 501). Thus, before
jumping to the conclusions about a potential external constraint on growth, it
seems necessary to examine the current account of evolution over time.
To complicate the situation further, Spanish foreign trade statistics have
been questioned by Jordi Maluquer de Motes (1999, pp. 110-111, 189) who
argues that exports to Cuba and the Philippines were overexaggerated during
the years 1895-1898, as they included supplies for the Spanish troops
(military equipment but also foodstuffs, clothing, etc.) that did not involve a
commercial transaction8. Were this the case, military supplies should be
removed from exports and considered as current Government transfers9.
6 Serrano Sanz (1997) departs from Thirlwall as he takes the evolution of relative prices into
account. If, alternatively, Herranz-Lonca´n and Tirado (1996) elasticities are used in Serrano Sanz
estimates, the results are not very different. It should be noted that since Serrano Sanz (1997)
employed the same data set as Herranz-Lonca´n and Tirado (1996), so his results are as questionable
as theirs (see footnote 5).
7 This would be the case because, in Serrano Sanz’s view (1997, p. 320), the alternative option
of financing the deficit through a surplus in other, smaller and more volatile components of the
balance of payments, such as services or unilateral transfers, was unlikely.
8 Maluquer de Motes (1999) accepts the argument put forward by a distinguished representa-
tive of the protectionist Basque lobby, Pablo de Alzola y Minondo (1903, pp. 34-35 and 89), who
claimed that the commodity trade surplus over 1896-1898 was fictitious and pointed out that, in
1897, 130 million pesetas in specie and substantial quantities of foodstuffs, clothing and weaponry
sent to supply colonial troops during the Cuban War of Independence were included as exports.
Unfortunately, the author does not provide any evidence to prove his assertion. In any case, it
should be noted that specie flows are excluded from my estimates of the commodity trade balance
(see section 3).
9 In a private communication, Francisco Comı´n informs me that it is highly unlikely that they
were Government transfers, as the cost of military supplies was assumed by Cuba’s colonial public
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Previously, however, one should prove that no commercial transaction had
taken place and military supplies were sent to the colonies by the Govern-
ment. If, alternatively, supplies for troops were provided by private firms,
they would represent exports. Furthermore, it could be simply the case that,
as a result of the increasing number of Spanish troops in the colonies, the
demand for foodstuffs and clothing increased. Another important reason
to explain the increase in exports to the colonies (and to the rest of the
world) during the late 1890s is the (real effective) depreciation of the Peseta
(Figure 9), which improved the competitiveness of Spanish exports. In fact,
the estimated values of the price elasticity of exports suggest that, other
things being equal, the depreciation would have triggered a significant rise
in the volume of exports10. Moreover, an examination of the official trade
statistics for 1897 indicates that there were no «State trade» separate records
for exports11. Therefore, I have not corrected official export figures to allow
for the hypothetical inclusion of the Government supplies to colonial troops.
Another objection to the revised figures for the 19th century Spanish
foreign trade has been raised by Tortella (1994)12. A contradiction between
the corrected trade balance figures — which reduce the commodity trade
deficit in the 1850s and 1860s and provide a surplus after 1870 — and
the inflow of foreign capital is highlighted by this author13. Tortella (1994,
p. 132) argues that, at the end of the 19th century, with a positive inflow of
capital and emigrant remittances, it would be hard to explain the peseta’s
depreciation if there was also a trade surplus. This assertion, which seems
logical at first sight, is, however, the result of identifying the commodity
trade balance with the current account balance, in other words, with the
overall balance for goods, services (which includes net income from abroad)
and current transfers (including emigrant remittances). Such identification
would be only warranted if the balances of services and current transfers
were close to equilibrium, or if they canceled each other. In the case of the
balance of services, such an assumption is inconsistent with the size of both
budget. As before, during the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878), the Cuban War of Independence was not
financed by Spain’s Government budget, but by Cuba’s colonial budget. Only after the Treaty of
Paris, Spain was forced to assume the cost of colonial debts (see Comı´n 2004).
10 The value of own price elasticity of demand ranged between 21.1 and 21.3 according to
Herranz-Lonca´n and Tirado (1996, pp. 23-24) and Serrano Sanz (1997, p. 123). A detailed analysis of
the trade between Spain and Cuba over 1878-1898 can be found in Piqueras Arenas (1998) in which
increasing Spanish exports are attributed to the competitiveness of Spanish goods, only partly as a
result of the depreciation of the peseta.
11 In fact, strictly military supplies (weapons and ammunition) represent a small share of
«general» exports. For example, firearms only amounted to 3.5 million pesetas in 1897.
12 cf. Prados de la Escosura (1986) for the revision of foreign trade figures between 1850
and 1913 in which official valuation of goods were corrected by using market prices and under-
registration of imports was revised upwards to allow for smuggling.
13 Tortella (1994) combines the official figures for the commodity trade balance with Broder’s
(1976) estimates for gross foreign investment to assess the current account balance.
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external public debt and foreign investment in the private sector, which
involved large interest and dividend payments. What is more, the assimila-
tion of gross foreign investment with the (negative of the) current account
balance is not validated as the latter only records net foreign investment
into Spain. Furthermore, migrant remittances, the main component of the
balance of current transfers, only became significant at the very end of the
period under consideration as Spanish mass emigration was a comparatively
late phenomenon in European perspective (Sa´nchez-Alonso 2000).
Tortella’s argument throws up questions worthy of careful consideration.
When did emigrant remittances become significant? Why did the deprecia-
tion not take place in 1883, as soon as the convertibility of the peseta was
suspended? What were the causes behind the delayed, post-1891 deprecia-
tion of the peseta? Sarda´ Dexeus (1948, p. 219) offered an early diagnosis:
«the economic causes of this depreciation may be linked to the possible
existence of domestic inflation caused by the increase in the quantity of
silver and bank notes, with repercussions on prices and the trade balance»,
while adding, «it is better to seek the immediate cause in the evolution of
the balance of payments.» It is Sarda´’s second interpretation, focused on the
balance of payments, the one that has found support in recent literature
(Gutie´rrez et al. 1998; Cubel et al. 1998; Sudria` and Tirado 2001).
Alternative interpretations to Sarda´’s have been offered. Pablo Martı´n
Acen˜a (1993, pp. 140-141) underlined the association between macro-
economic stability and a stable exchange rate of the peseta. Tortella (1994)
identified the financial problems of the Government as the main cause of
the nominal depreciation of the Spanish currency between 1891 and 1905.
More recently, Marcela Sabate´ et al. (2006) concluded that the treasury-
financing needs led to money creation and, hence, to sacrificing a fixed
exchange rate.
Unfortunately, the debate is seriously constraint by the lack of quantita-
tive evidence about Spain’s international position. The first step requires the
reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account, a task to
which the section 3 of the paper is devoted.
3. A PRELIMINARY RECONSTRUCTION OF THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT
The balance of payments systematically summarizes the economic
transactions of an economy with the rest of the world. These are the trans-
actions involving goods, services and income, financial claims on and
liabilities to the rest of the world and transfers (IMF 1993, p. 6). I have
estimated every item of the balance of payments on current account (com-
modity and service trade and current transfers). The procedure and sources
used in the reconstruction of the main components of balance of payments
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on current account are summarily discussed in this section, although enough
detail is provided for the reader who wants to replicate the computations.
Needless to say, these computations are highly tentative, and only further
research will eliminate the errors that fraught my estimates.
3.1. Commodity Trade Balance
3.1.1. Exports and imports of goods
Free on board (f.o.b.) value of goods exported and imported needs to be
computed. Estimates on the basis of Spanish official trade statistics and
corrected for quantity underestimation, including an estimate of smuggling
through Gibraltar and Portugal, and for price biases by Prados de la Esco-
sura (1986) have been used14. Cost, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) imports
were converted into f.o.b. imports to comply with the balance of payment
conventions.
3.1.2. Gold and silver
Quantities of gold and silver recorded in Spanish trade statistics (coins,
bars and paste) are considered as monetary gold and silver and, therefore,
not included in the estimates of net exports of goods and services15.
3.2. Service Trade Balance
Three main categories are considered under the following labels: (a)
freight and insurance services, (b) tourism, emigrants’ funds, passenger
services and other services and (c) net income from abroad.
3.2.1. Freight and insurance
Freight income received for exports carried in Spanish ships minus
freight expenses paid for imports transported in foreign vessels constitute the
14 Official imports for 1850-1913 have now been corrected with a coefficient derived from a
sample of Spain’s main trading partners instead of with coefficients obtained from commodity and
country samples for primary products and manufactures, respectively, as in Prados de la Escosura
(1986). This change has been introduced to maintain consistency with Tena (1992) and Martı´nez
Ruı´z (2003, 2006) estimates for 1914-1958. The new results are, nonetheless, very close to the earlier
ones.
15 There are serious doubts about the way in which gold and silver exports and imports were
recorded in official trade statistics (Tortella 1974, pp. 121-122). It could be argued that, since Spain
never was part of the Gold Standard, trade in gold and silver should be treated as non-monetary. The
fact that Spanish monetary authorities often shadowed the gold parity has led me to consider gold
and silver exports and imports as monetary.
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first item to be computed under this label. Following Douglass North and Alan
Heston (1960), the freight-value method, or freight factor, was preferred to the
earnings per ton method16. Total freight revenues on exports and imports were
first computed by applying freight factors to the f.o.b. value of exports and
imports and, then, in order to ascertain the freight income on exports (a credit
for Spain), the share of tonnage exported carried under Spanish flag was used,
while the share of imported tonnage in foreign ships was employed to compute
freight expenses on imports17. In addition, freight income from carrying trade
between foreign ports was assumed, following North and Matthew Simon, to
represent a percentage of freight earnings and a 10 per cent of freight income
on exports was accepted18. Port outlays by Spanish ships in foreign ports and
by foreign ships in Spain’s harbors as payments for port dues, loading and
unloading expenses and coal are assumed to represent a fixed share of shipping
earnings and expenses19. Foreign ships transported more tonnage than in
Spanish vessels as they exhibited, according to Jesu´s Valdaliso (1991, p. 71), a
more efficient transport capacity ratio. I assumed that more fully loaded vessels
made smaller outlays per ship and, hence, port outlays by Spanish ships
abroad (a debit) were established at 30 per cent of the freight income on
exports while port outlays by foreign ships in Spain (a credit) were fixed at
20 per cent of freight expenses on imports20. Finally, marine insurance income
and expenses were computed under the widely shared assumption that
underwriting follows the flag and exports in Spanish ships were, hence, usually
insured by Spanish companies while imports in foreign vessels were insured by
foreign companies21. I arbitrarily assumed that the insurance rates were
identical by Spanish and foreign companies and accepted those used by Prados
de la Escosura (1986), to which I added an extra 2 per cent to include shipping
commissions and brokerage.
3.2.2. Tourism, emigrants’ funds, passenger services and other services
Yearly income from tourist services was derived on the basis of expenses
per visitor (net of Spanish tourist expenses abroad) calculated by Francisco
16 cf. Simon (1960) to whom I tried to follow as closely as the data permitted. Freight factor is
the ratio of freight costs to the current value of traded commodities.
17 Freight factors are taken from Prados de la Escosura (1986). The distribution of tons
exported and imported between Spanish and foreign ships comes from Valdaliso (1991).
18 cf. North (1960) and Simon (1960) who assumed a 20 per cent. Given the less efficient
Spanish merchant shipping, I arbitrarily adopted a 10 per cent.
19 For similar assumptions for the United States and the Netherlands, cf. Simon (1960) and
Smits et al. (2000).
20 The idea that more fully loaded ships made smaller outlays is taken from Simon (1960).
These figures roughly correspond to those accepted by Smits et al. (2000).
21 This assumption is borrowed from Simon (1960). It could, however, overexaggerate Spain’s
earnings from marine insurance, as it was rather common for Spanish ships to be underwritten by
foreign companies (Lloyd’s, for example)
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Ja´inaga for 1931, times the annual number of tourists and, then, reflated with
a cost of living index to obtain the current price estimates (Ja´inaga 1932)22.
Unfortunately, the total number of tourists is only known since 1929 and was
backward projected to 1882 with the rate of variation of passengers arriving
by sea, while no tourism was assumed to exist over 1850-188123.
Spain was a net emigration country over the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies (cf. Sa´nchez-Alonso 1995). Emigrants carried small sums with them to
cover their arrival expenses. It can be reckoned that, by 1931, emigrant funds to
America represented, on average, 200 gold pesetas, that is, 400 current pesetas,
including the fare and small amounts to cover arrival expenses24. If the fare
represented around 340 current pesetas, 60 pesetas would correspond to the
emigrant’s funds25. However, Ja´inaga only added «a small amount for una-
voidable expenses» to the cost of the passage, and this sum is most likely an
underestimation26. I, therefore, accepted a higher estimate of 100 pesetas for
those emigrating to America, and one-tenth, ten pesetas, for those to Algeria
(and to France) in the eve of the World War I27. These average sums times the
number of emigrants to America, Algeria and France cast an yearly series of
emmigrants’ funds that was reflated with a wage index28.
In addition, revenues and expenses from passenger transport have to be
taken into account. Fares paid by tourists carried by Spanish ships and by
returning immigrants by Spanish vessels are included on the credit side,
while fares paid by emmigrants to foreign shipping companies represented a
debit. The number of migrants provided by Blanca Sa´nchez-Alonso (1995)
for 1882-1913 has been completed with an estimate of migration for the
years 1850-1881 on the basis of the scattered foreign evidence29. The share of
22 The implicit assumption here is that the real expenses per tourist remained constant over
time. The cost of living index has resulted from splicing Ojeda’s (1988) index for 1909-1913 with
Reher and Ballesteros (1993) for the previous years. The alternative use of Maluquer de Motes
(2006) consumer price index does not change the results significantly.
23 For passengers arriving by ship, cf. Nicolau (2005, p. 139). The low numbers in the early
1880s allows the presumption that tourism was not economically significant until the late 19th
century.
24 Figure computed from Ja´inaga (1932).
25 Va´zquez (1988) provides third class fares to Cuba (325 pesetas), Argentina and Brazil (356
pesetas) in 1930 that yield an average of 340 pesetas.
26 This figure, sixty pesetas, corresponds to a lower bound estimate of the average funds
brought by Italian immigrants into the United States in 1892, according to Simon (1960, pp. 676-
677).
27 The one-to-ten ratio was derived by comparing fares to America (Va´zquez (1988)) with those
to Algeria (Ministerio de Trabajo, 1942) in 1934. These are roughly similar to the lower-bound
figures produced by Marolla and Roccas (1992, p. 252) for Italian emigrants to America and Europe
in 1911. Llorde´n (1988, p. 62), on the other hand, provides a larger sum for Spanish emigrants’ funds
in the 1860s, 125-200 pesetas, once the fare is deducted.
28 Unskilled wages come from Reher and Ballesteros (1993).
29 For 1850-1881, figures of Spanish immigration in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and the United
States, provided by the recipient countries’ official statistics were completed with emigration to
Cuba in 1860-1861 from Anuario(s) Estadı´stico(s) that was assumed to remain constant over the
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arrivals and departures in Spanish and foreign ships is provided by official
migration statistics from 1911 onwards and shows a stable pattern, roughly
one-third of the emmigrants returned home under Spanish flag and three-
fourths left in foreign ships30. These shares were accepted for the 19th and
early 20th centuries. The fares for trips to Argentina, Cuba and Algeria are
derived from Alejandro Va´zquez, Moise´s Llorde´n and official emigration
statistics31.
Finally, Government transactions (credits and debits) were, in turn, taken
from official sources (Dı´az Garcı´a 1976).
3.2.3. Net income from abroad
Ascertaining the amount of and the returns to each type of capital asset
invested abroad and of foreign capital invested at home is fraught with so
many difficulties that has often discouraged the direct estimate of net
incomes of foreign capital in historical studies32.
The alternative indirect approach starts from a benchmark estimate of a
country’s international indebtedness at the beginning of the considered
period that is yearly updated with the net inflow of capital. Such a convenient
approach produces, however, a very crude estimate, as the initial amount of
a country’s international indebtedness is not accurately computed and,
especially, the interest rate used does not capture the average returns of a
wide and changing variety of capital assets. Any alteration in the interest
(F’note continued)
period. Emmigration to Algeria was derived from Spanish arrivals in Alger and Oran for the years
1872-1881, while the figures for 1850-1871 were estimated under the arbitrary assumption that the
share of emigrants who remained in Algeria after 1 year of residence was similar to the one over the
period 1872-1881 (25 per cent). Estimates for returned migration was computed by assuming that
the average returns from America for 1869-1873 were acceptable for 1850-1868, while 92 per cent of
emmigrants to Algeria returned home within the first year. A consistency check of the yearly
migration data was performed using the migration balances from the population censuses along the
lines described in Sa´nchez-Alonso (1995). Data for returned migration from America, 1869-1881,
30 Consejo Superior de Emigracio´n (1916) offers evidence for 1911-1915. The actual percen-
tages used were 0.354 for returned migration under Spanish flag and 0.764 for immigrants in
foreign ships.
31 cf. Llorde´n (1988) for fares to Havana over the period 1862-1876; Va´zquez (1988) provides
the lowest fares to Cuba, Brazil and Argentina over the period 1880-1913 at 1913 prices that I have
reflated to obtain the current price fares using the same Sarda´ Dexeus (1948) wholesale price index
that he employed to derive constant price fares. Missing years were interpolated (1862 fares to Cuba
were accepted for 1850-1861; fares to Argentina before 1880 were assumed to moved along fares to
Cuba). I assumed that fares to Algeria moved along the fares to America and that the fare ratio of
Algeria/Argentina in 1934 (Ministerio de Trabajo, 1942) was stable over the considered period. I also
assumed that the tourist fares from Europe were moved along the migrants’ fares.
32 This is why, in their pioneering research on Britain and the United States in the 19th century,
Imlah (1958), North (1960) and Simon (1960) employed an indirect approach. Later, Le´vy-Leboyer
(1977) and Brezis (1995) followed the same approach for 19th century France and 18th century
Britain, respectively.
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rate applied and/or in the initial estimate of international indebtedness
provokes large differences in absolute terms in the long run (North 1960,
pp. 574-575).
Therefore, in spite of its shortcomings, I have preferred to use a direct
approach. Because of the dearth of data, only very crude estimates of foreign
capital incomes (dividends and interest payments to private foreign capital
and external debt service), on the debit side, and of Spanish labor returns
abroad (wages and salaries), on the credit side, have been carried out. These
are the main components of net income from abroad, as neither foreign
labor in Spain nor Spanish investments abroad were significant over the
period considered.
On the debit side, three main items are distinguished: (1) the external
debt service; (2) dividends and interests paid to railway shares and deben-
tures owned by foreigners; and (3) returns to foreign factors in mining33.
Service payments on the external debt have been computed by applying
specific interest rates to each class of the Government bonds34. Some caveats
are needed about the volume of external public debt in foreign hands. After
the sovereign debt rescheduling in 1882, which exchanged existing foreign
debt for new bonds (at 43.75 per cent of its nominal value), and simulta-
neously with the abandonment of gold convertibility of Spanish currency in
1883, debt repatriation started as Spaniards found more secure to invest in
bonds serviced in gold pesetas as a shelter against currency depreciation35.
Since 1891, when the peseta started depreciating, Spanish citizens purchased
external debt bonds while foreign bondholders tried to get rid of them. The
Government reacted by introducing the so called «affidavit» in 1898, which
implied that only non-resident bondholders would continue receiving their
interest payments in gold pesetas (or in French francs), while the rest would
be paid in current pesetas (and offered to convert their external debt bonds
into internal debt). As a result, the external public debt fell, in 1903, to 52.7
per cent of its volume in 1898, which implies that Spanish residents had
purchased almost half of the Spain’s external public debt between 1891 and
1898. Hence, only half of the interests paid (52.7 per cent) on external debt
should be computed as payments to foreign capital invested in external debt
over 1891-1898. I have, then, assumed that the interest payments effectively
paid to foreign bondholders over 1891-1902 should be computed on the
33 According to Stone (1999, p. 251), public debt, railways and mining represented, on average,
24.3, 25.3 and 31.2 per cent, respectively, of total British portfolio investment in Spain over the
period of 1865-1913.
34 External debt figures and the interest rates applied are provided in Ferna´ndez Acha
(1976).
35 This appears to be a case of «original sin», to use Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)
expression to describe external debt denominated in gold or in foreign currency. For this paragraph,
I draw on Sarda´ Dexeus (1948) who provides a detailed evaluation of Spain’s external public debt in
the late 19th and early 20th century.
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volume of external debt in existence in 190336. Moreover, in so far, the
external debt was serviced in gold pesetas, and the amount of interests paid
(obtained by applying the interest rate to foreign debt in non residents’
hands) has to be increased by the depreciation rate of the current peseta with
respect to the gold peseta over 1891-191437.
Railway companies were highly concentrated and the detailed research by
Pedro Tedde de Lorca (1978, 1980) provides enough evidence to estimate
dividends on share capital and interests on debentures paid to non-residents38.
Dividends paid to shareholders and interest payments on debentures issued by
the three major railway companies are available from the mid-19th century
onwards (Tedde de Lorca 1978)39. Both the percentage represented by the
three main companies in total capital invested in railways and the proportion
of railways’ capital in foreign hands have to be ascertained to compute the
returns to foreign capital invested in Spanish railways. Tedde de Lorca pro-
vides total capital shares and bonds held by the three major companies and its
proportion in total investment, and, on the basis of Albert Broder’s research
(Broder 1976), also the participation of French capital in total capital invested in
1867, at the time of network construction, and over the 19th century40. Broder’s
(1976, p. 62) estimates of foreign investment in railways allowed, in turn, to
rescale French railways’ capital to cover all foreign capital41.
Foreign capital in mining was mainly British. On the basis of the effective
capital invested by British companies and cumulated total foreign invest-
ment in mining, it can be suggested that, over 1870-1913, more than half of
all foreign capital in Spanish mining came from the United Kingdom42.
36 An alternative hypothesis is to assume that the external public debt gradually passed into
Spanish hands. The results of this alternative computation, although provide higher interest pay-
ments, do not change the trend of the estimates used here.
37 This is the usual result of the so-called «original sin». The depreciation rate of the peseta
against the French franc provided by Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005) has been used.
38 See Tedde de Lorca (1978, 1980) for research on Norte, MZA and Andaluces, the three main
railway companies. Evidence on foreign investment in railways has been gathered in Broder (1976,
1981).
39 Appendices IV-9 and IV-18 provides the data on dividends and interests paid by Norte and
MZA, whereas Tedde de Lorca (1980, pp. 44-45) presents the same evidence for Andaluces.
40 cf. Tedde de Lorca (1978, pp. 243-244, 248-251, 256-257; 1980: 37, 40). Thus, I have esti-
mated, first, the dividend and interest payments corresponding to French citizens by applying the
share of French capital in total capital for the three big railway companies. Then, I have rescaled the
resulting sum by the share of French capital invested in these three companies over total French
investment in Spanish railways. The latter share is only available for the years 1867 and 1890; hence,
I have used that one for 1867 for the pre-1867 years, and the 1890 share for the post-1890 period,
while I interpolated log-linearly 1867 and 1890 shares over 1868-1889.
41 I rescaled interest and dividend payments to French capital by its share in total foreign
capital invested in Spanish railways using the decennial shares provided over 1850-1913 by Broder
(1976).
42 cf. Harvey and Taylor (1987, p. 197) for British capital (effective share capital and debentures
and mortgage bonds). Cumulated total foreign investment (excluding railways) and cumulated
French investment in mining were derived from Broder (1976, 1981). When only French and British
capital in mining are considered (the large majority of it), the British share ranged from 63 to 73 per
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Decadal averages of dividend and interest payments to British companies are
provided by Charles Harvey and Peter Taylor (1987) that were rescaled to
include all payments to foreign capital in Spanish mining for 1851-1913,
assuming similar rates of return in non-British foreign investment, and using
the estimated British participation in total foreign capital43. Estimates of
foreign capital returns in mining derived through this procedure were, then,
distributed annually with an index of non-retained value in Spanish mineral
exports44.
Assessing returns to Spanish labor employed abroad is a complex task as
labor incomes (wages and salaries), which belong to the balance of services,
have to be distinguished from emmigrants’ remittances, which belong to the
balance of unilateral transfers. Actually, the distinction can only be made
since 1917, and I accepted that only 5 per cent of those emmigrating to
America and 60 per cent of those migrating to Algeria returned within the
year over 1850-191345. The next step was to assess the amount that, on
average, was brought home by Spanish workers returning after 1 year, or
less, away from home. I computed an average sum that was taken home by
the temporary emmigrant or sent annually by the long-term emmigrant to
their relatives and friends. Estimates of total sums sent home by emmigrants
cent over 1870-1900, the mining boom years (and only 22-41 per cent in the earlier period 1851-70).
If, alternatively, Broder’s estimates of non-railway investment from other countries are cumulated,
British capital represented from 52 to 61 per cent over 1870-1900 (22–31 per cent in 1851-1870).
Evidence in Mun˜oz et al. (1976) indicates that British capital was above 50 per cent in the years
1900-13 (53 per cent on average for 1900 and 1912).
43 Unfortunately, Chastagnaret (2000) does not carry out a similar estimate to that of Harvey
and Taylor (1987) for the British capital invested in mining that would have precluded this crude
estimate. Thus, British participation in total foreign capital was assumed to be 30 per cent in
1850-70, 60 per cent in 1870-1890 and 50 per cent in 1890-1913 (see the previous footnote).
44 Non-retained exports represent the value of exports receipts that accrued to foreign pro-
ductive factors used in mining production and, therefore, were not kept in Spain. Non-retained
values over total mineral export proceeds represent 0.35 for iron ore, 0.40 for lead, 0.49 and 0.625
for copper pyrites (before and after 1896), 0.54 for mercury, according to Prados de la Escosura
(1988) who took them from Gonza´lez Portilla (1981), Broder (1981), Harvey (1981) and Nadal
(1975), respectively. The revisionist work by Escudero (1996) suggests that these shares should be
revised upwards and Te´mime, Broder and Chastagneret (1982) pointed out that 70-75 per cent of
export proceeds were not retained in Spain. Escudero (1998) has estimated that the share of foreign
returns in Basque iron ore mining represented 39.5 per cent (204 million pesetas) of its total over
1876-1913, to which should be added the differential between market prices and much lower
preferential prices (that foreign mining companies charged their matrix firms abroad) times the
quantities sold at preferential prices, approximately 200 million pesetas, so the share of non-
retained exports would be over half of the total export proceeds. I have used, then, non-retained
shares of 0.55 for iron ore, 0.90 for lead and 0.73 for pyrites.
45 Evidence on transatlantic immigrants returned after less than a year abroad is presented in
Ya´n˜ez (1994) for 1917-1921 and 1925-1930 and in Ministerio de Trabajo (1942, p. 14), for 1926-
1934. It represents between 3.5 and 6.2 per cent of total immigration to America, averaging 5 per
cent. I have accepted 5 per cent for the period 1850-1913. For the share of immigrants to Algeria
returning within a year, Bonmatı´ (1989, p. 135) points to 59 per cent of total emmigrants.
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have been gathered in recent historical research for the early 20th century46.
Jose´ Ramo´n Garcı´a Lo´pez (1992) presents the most comprehensive estimates
for the years before the World War I — 250-300 million pesetas as an annual
average over 1906-1910 that amounts around 340-400 pesetas per emmigrant
(either returning home or sending remittances). I accepted 400 pesetas per
emmigrant as a benchmark that was, then, projected backwards and forward
with a nominal wage index constructed for the destination countries and
adjusted for the exchange rate between the peseta and each destination
country’s currency over 1850-191347. Finally, returns to Spanish labor
abroad were obtained by multiplying the annual sum per head with the
number of emigrants returning home within their first year abroad.
3.3. Current Transfers Balance
Emmigrants’ remittances constituted its main historical component in
Spain before 1913. Not all emmigrants sent money home while being abroad.
In historical estimates, it is usually accepted that most of those who estab-
lished themselves abroad stopped sending money after 5 or 6 years either
because they have already paid for their debts or because they planned to
invest in the receiving country. I arbitrarily assumed that emmigrants only
sent money home within their first 5 years and computed the emmigrants’
remittances by multiplying the estimated average sum per emmigrant with
the cumulative figure of emmigrants arrived in the last 5 years, after
deducting those migrants who returned home within 1 year48.
3.4. The Balance of Payments on Current Account and the Net
Inflow of Capital
Adding up the balances of goods, services — including net payments
to foreign factors — and unilateral transfers, the balance of payments on
current account is obtained.
46 Unfortunately, no distinction can be made between short- and long-term migrants. Con-
temporary estimates are collected in Chamorro (1976), for 1899, 1900 and 1904; Va´zquez (1988) for
1906, 1908-1913 and 1920-1922; and Garcı´a Lo´pez (1992), averages for 1906-1910 and 1920-1921.
47 Nominal wages for Argentina are collected in Williamson (1995). Zanetti and Garcı´a (1977)
provide nominal wages for Cuba from 1903 onwards. French nominal wages from Williamson
(1995) are used for emmigrants to France and Algeria. The trading exchange rates of the peseta
against the peso, the French franc and the US dollar are computed on the basis of Corte´s Conde
(1979), Della Paolera (1988) and Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005).
48 As explained in the previous section, because of the lack of data, no distinction has been
made between the sum brought back home by the emmigrant who returned home within his/her
first year abroad and the average remittances sent during the first 5 years abroad by the rest of
emmigrants. Following Simon (1960), I have attributed double weight to the last one of each 5-year
period considered.
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The net inflow of capital — that is, the capital account balance — has
been derived, in turn, by adding the negative of the current account balance
to the increase in foreign reserves, computed from yearly estimates of the
stock of gold and silver49. An alternative estimate of annual variation in
reserves is provided by net exports of gold and silver in the official trade
statistics. However, its lack of coverage of total specie flows, due to smug-
gling, did not advice its use (Tortella 1974, pp. 121-122)50.
Finally, annual series of Spain’s international indebtedness can be obtained
by adding up the net inflow of capital to the level of indebtedness at the
beginning of each year. The level of international indebtedness at the beginning
of 1850 is, at best, an informed guess and has been assumed to be equivalent
to the nominal value of external public debt, 1505 million pesetas (Comı´n 1996,
p. 131), since private foreign investment has been considered negligible until
mid-19th century (Sarda´ Dexeus 1948, p. 262). Needless to say, the resulting
estimates are very tentative and should be taken with a grain of salt.
4. TRENDS IN SPAIN’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
Clearly defined periods can be distinguished in the commodity trade bal-
ance: one of the deficits — but for 3 years, 1854-1856 — from 1850 to the 1866
crisis, followed by one of the surpluses — but for 1 year, 1876, — up to the eve of
the World War I (Figure 1). When we turn to the balance of services, a persistent
deficit is observed. Transport, tourism and intergovernmental transactions
show a negative sign (Figure 2), and, more important, its main item, net income
from abroad, too (Figure 3). The service of the public debt dominated the net
income from abroad until the beginning of the Restoration (1876). After the
sovereign debt rescheduling (1882) and, especially, from 1890 onwards, this
situation changed with net returns to foreign capital in railways and mining
49 The stock of gold and silver for 1850-1873 comes from Tortella (1982) and is reproduced in
Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005, pp. 678-679). The gold stock derives, for 1874-1900, from Tortella
(1974, pp. 128–132) — who, for the years 1874-1896, linearly interpolated contemporary estimates
of the stock of gold — and for 1901-1913, from Martı´n Acen˜a (1985, pp. 93-97; gold reserves). The
stock of silver for 1874-1913 has been obtained from Anes (1974, pp. 111-112). A similar approach
was used for the 19th century United States by North (1960, p. 599).
50 I have checked the figures on net gold exports in the Spanish official statistics against those
provided by the statistics of two main trading partners of Spain, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The comparison suggests that Spain was a net gold importer and whenever she became an
exporter, the size of the surplus was small. Net coinage of gold and silver — that is, excluding
coinage of already existing currency — a proxy for net gold and silver imports, continued during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century although interruptions took place (Tortella 1974; Anes 1974).
These findings are at odds with the historical literature surveyed by Tortella (1974) in which claims
of large illegal gold exports during the 1880s are frequent. For example, Barthe (1905) reckoned a
gold outflow of 630 million pesetas over 1883-1891. Sarda´ Dexeus (1948, p. 202) suggests, in turn,
a figure of 1,000 million over 1881-1891. A possible alternative explanation would be that gold
hoarding — another reason for gold disappearance in Tortella’s view — prevailed over illegal gold
exports.
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FIGURE 1
COMMODITY TRADE BALANCE (MILLION PESETAS)
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FIGURE 2
SERVICES TRADE BALANCE (EXCLUDING NET INCOME FROM ABROAD)
(MILLION PESETAS)
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gaining weight. Emmigrant remittances became increasingly important from
the late 1880s and increased dramatically since 1904 offsetting, at least in part,
the net payments to foreign factors (Figure 4).
Adding up the commodity, services and current transfer balances results in
the current account balance. Two distinctive phases with 1891 as a turning
point can be distinguished. A sustained current account deficit was in place
throughout 1850-1890 — except for 4 years. Then, from 1891 up to the World
War I, a surplus prevailed with the years 1899-1904 as the only exception
(Figure 5)51. The highly tentative estimates of the net inflow of capital match
the inverse pattern of the current account balance, although they exhibit a
higher level over 1859-1873 and, especially, a lower one during the years 1883-
1890 (Figure 6). Finally, crude estimates of the annual balance of Spain’s
international indebtedness are presented in Figure 7. It appears that interna-
tional indebtedness grew up to 1879, stabilized, then, until 1890, and exhibited
a steady decline thereafter, but for a short reversal over 1899-190452.
FIGURE 3
SERVICES TRADE BALANCE: NET INCOME FROM ABROAD (MILLION PESETAS)
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Source: See text.
51 The finding of a current account surplus from 1891 onwards confirms contemporary quan-
titative assessments of Spain’s International position. cf. Prados de la Escosura (1988, p. 196).
52 These results confirm Sarda´ Dexeus (1948, p. 274) upward trend up to 1881 (4,200 million
pesetas), but do not correspond to the slightly higher level he estimated for 1913 (4,500 million).
Sarda´’s lower levels stem from the fact that he uses the so-called «effective» external debt on the
grounds that external public debt was never traded above 50 per cent of its nominal value Sarda´
Dexeus (1948, p. 257), and assumed that only represented 800 million pesetas by mid-19th century.
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FIGURE 4
CURRENT TRANSFERS BALANCE (MILLION PESETAS)
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FIGURE 5
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (MILLION PESETAS)
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The sharp contrast between the commodity and current account balances
is clearly a most striking result. The commodity trade balance is positive in
50 out of the 64 years, with deficit concentrated in the years 1858-1866 — in
which large imports associated to railway construction took place; meanwhile
FIGURE 6
NET CAPITAL INFLOW (MILLION PESETAS)
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FIGURE 7
SPAIN’S INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS (MILLION PESETAS)
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the current account was in deficit for most of the time except for 1891-1898 and
1905-1913. These two periods and 1858-1866 are the only ones in which the
signs of the two balances match each other.
The divergent evolution of the various components of the balance of
payments allow us to reconcile the positions of those who maintained that,
from 1870 onwards, the commodity trade deficit resulting from the official
figures was implausible (Prados de la Escosura 1986) and those who stressed
that Spain’s international position was one of the deficits (Sarda´ Dexeus
1948; Tortella 1994). The explanation for the apparent contradiction between
the two balances is to be found in the growing role played by net income
from abroad that was not counterbalanced by current transfers, as emmi-
grant remittances only became significant from 1904 onwards. Thus, the
current account deficit appears to be associated to the costs of investing in
new infrastructures and exploiting natural resources.
How could the current account surplus over the years 1891-1898 and
1905-1913 be explained? The reasons behind the change from a current
account deficit to a surplus can be explored in the light of the phenomenon
known as «sudden stops.» Sebastian Edwards (2004, p. 19) has defined a
sudden stop episode as «an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflow to a
country that up to that time had been receiving large volumes of foreign
capital.» Sudden stops are, thus, sharp reversals in capital inflows that
constrict domestic consumption smoothing53. During the first wave of
financial globalization that took place in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, two main effects are associated to sudden stops: drops in the exchange
rate and deceleration of economic activity54.
Exogenous forces conditioned sudden stops. Monetary tightening in core
countries (e.g. increases in the central bank discount rates) represented a sig-
nificant exogenous element in the reversal of capital inflows. Also international
crisis irradiating from capital importer countries, such as Argentina during the
Baring crisis in the early 1890s, constituted an exogenous force to be taken on
board. However, the fact that not all capital importers suffered to the same
extent a given sudden stop suggests that endogenous factors mattered.
Let us examine the Spanish experience in the light of sudden stops (SS,
hereafter). In Figure 8, international capital flows, proxied by British-, French-
and German-aggregated current account (excluding all gold flows), are con-
fronted with the net capital inflow in Spain, both expressed in Sterling55.
53 Interestingly, this approach has been a neglected in the Spanish historical literature. This is,
perhaps, attributable to the isolated consideration of Spain’s experience.
54 The contraction in external financing implies that the current account has to improve
through currency depreciation and GDP contraction unless international reserves absorb the shock.
cf. Catao’s (2007) excellent study on which I draw for the next paragraphs. Also see, Bordo et al.
(2010).
55 Data for net capital exports from the United Kingdom, France and Germany come from
Jones and Obstfeld (1997).
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Several slowdown episodes in international capital flows are observed starting
in 1866, 1873, 1890 and 1896, of which those of 1873 and 1890 appear to have
special intensity. In Spain, sudden stops can be observed in 1866-1869, 1876-
1880, 1890-1896 and 1904-1907, with especial intensity in the last two episodes.
Interestingly, the last sudden stop, at odds with the previous ones, occurred
while international capital exports were accelerating during the decade before
the World War I.
Which of the predicted effects of the SS are found in the Spanish experi-
ence? To begin with, currency crashes occurred during 1891-1893 and 1896-
1898, but not in earlier SS, or in 1904-1907 — when the opposite happened and
the peseta returned to its previous position in 1891 — (Figure 9)56. Why such
an uneven response to different SS? The consequences of two exogenous
events, the Baring crisis (1890) and the Cuban War of Independence (1896-
1898) are, no doubt, part of the explanation. According to Luis Catao (2007,
FIGURE 8
INTERNATIONAL NET CAPITAL FLOW AND SPAIN’S NET CAPITAL INFLOW
(MILLION STERLING)
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Sources: Obstfeld and Jones (1997), and see text for Spain’s net capital inflow.
56 The 1890s sudden stops conform with Calvo et al. (2003) model in which an abrupt inter-
ruption of foreign capital inflow leads to a deep current account reversal and a substantial depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate (measured as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
The multilateral nominal effective exchange rate has been computed using Spain’s bilateral trade
weights for most of its trading partners (Prados de la Escosura and Tena (1994). The real effective
exchange rate is a multilateral rate index calculated using consumer price indices (CPIs) for the
main trading partners and the private consumption deflator for Spain (Prados de la Escosura 2003).
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pp. 266-269), during the first wave of financial globalization, countries that
experienced rapid monetary expansion and had a lax fiscal behavior were
more prone to currency crashes57. In fact, money supply (M2) appears to
have grown above GDP in Spain during the cyclical upswings 1885-1889 and
1896-1898 (Figure 10). Meanwhile, the public debt/GDP ratio, sharply
reduced as a result of the sovereign debt rescheduling in 1882, experienced a
sustained increase over 1893-1896 and went further up in the aftermath of
Cuban War of Independence, 1899-1903 (Figure 11)58.
The simultaneity of sudden stops and exchange rate drops during the
1890s tends to play down the role of the suspension of the gold convertibility
of the peseta (1883) suggesting that, during the 1880s, as long as an inflow of
foreign capital continued, the Spanish currency remained stable, regardless
of whether the exchange rate floated or not (Figure 9).
FIGURE 9
SPAIN’S CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% GDP) AND NOMINAL AND REAL
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE (19135100), 1870-1913
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Source: See the text.
57 In addition, Edwards (2004, p. 33) points out that the probability of experiencing a current
account reversal is higher for a country with a large current account deficit, a high external debt
ratio and a rapid rate of growth of domestic credit.
58 Interestingly, although Cuban War of independence (1896-1898) does not seem to have had a
major direct negative effect on Spain’s economy, the macroeconomic instability brought about by
the financing of the military conflict was to have significant effects on Spain’s position of interna-
tional isolation. cf. Fraile and Escribano (1998). On the financing of the war, cf. Maluquer de Motes
(1996) and Tedde de Lorca (1999).
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This result has implications for the debate between those who emphasize
the advantages of a floating exchange rate for a developing economy due to
the high opportunity cost of maintaining gold reserves as well as the shock
FIGURE 10
RATIO M2/GDP (1874-1913)
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FIGURE 11
PUBLIC DEBT/GDP (1884-1913)
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absorber role of the exchange rate (Sarda´ Dexeus 1948; Tortella 1974;
Flandreau and Zumer 2004), and those who stress that belonging to the Gold
Standard sent the right signal of compliance with orthodox financial practice
to capital markets (Martı´n Acen˜a 1993; Bordo and Rockoff 1996). To the
extent that it could be factored out, macroeconomic stability rather than
belonging to the Gold Standard seems to have been the relevant signal for
international investors.
When macroeconomic discipline was abandoned at the time of the
Baring crisis and, then, again, by the need to financing the Cuban War of
Independence, the control mechanism that stopped the peseta from falling
disappeared59. Macroeconomic instability, especially inflation, which soared
over 1895-1904 (Figure 12), had negative effects on the reputation of Spain’s
economy making it less attractive to international capital, as suggested by the
FIGURE 12
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Source: GDP deflator from Prados de la Escosura (2003).
59 For those who favour the importance of being part of the Gold Standard, the argument
would be that, as long as the belief in the authorities’ commitment to restoring convertibility at the
pre-1883 parity existed in the markets, the peseta would remain unaltered. Then, when macro-
economic instability occurred, economic agents realized that the suspension of convertibility was
not a temporary measure and that the authorities had no intention of restoring convertibility. This
situation led to an outflow of capital which dragged the peseta down (cf. Bordo and Kydland 1995).
Martı´n Acen˜a (1993, pp. 140-145) notes that the hopes of a rapid return to the parity of 1883,
together with the government’s restrictive policies, would have contributed to the peseta’s stability.
LEANDRO PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA
196 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
spread between the discount rate of the Bank of Spain and those of the
central banks in the main capital-investing countries (Figure 13)60.
After the independence of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, a
current account deficit reappeared between 1899 and 1906 that could be
associated to the repatriation of capital from the former colonies in the
sound economic environment provided by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde’s stabiliza-
tion plan (Comı´n 1999).
Why, then, the sudden stop of 1904-1907, at the time of an international
expansion of capital flows, and why the current account reversal was accom-
panied by an improvement in the exchange rate of the peseta? There are good
reasons to explain why the exchange rate did not drop. The fact that, for most
of the period up to the World War I, inflation remained moderate and the debt/
GDP and M2/GDP ratios were continued falling, as opposed to what had
happened in the 1890s, help explain why a currency crash was avoided. Further-
more, no exogenous events such as the Cuban War of Independence took
place while emmigrant remittances played an important offsetting role in the
current account balance (Figure 4). But, why was Spain left aside from the
FIGURE 13
INTEREST RATE SPREAD IN SPAIN (1884-1913): DIFFERENTIAL WITH ENGLAND,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY
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Sources: Central banks’ discount rates for Spain Martı´n Acen˜a and Pons (2005), Britain, France and
Germany Homer and Sylla (1991).
60 Bordo and Rockoff’s (1996, p. 414) claim that Spain had a 3 per cent risk premium as a non-
gold standard country is confirmed by the evidence presented in Figure 13.
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international wave of investment before the World War I? It is noteworthy
that Italian and the Portuguese current account balances also experienced a
surplus during this period (Bordo et al. 2010; Catao 2007). Meanwhile,
Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Russia became the main capital importers.
Why were South–Western European countries excluded? Was it because
investment opportunities had dried up, or because the opportunity cost was
too high? It would be worth investigating the extent to which the decline in a
sustainable current account deficit results from a reduction in foreigners’
demand of an emerging country’s assets (Edwards 2004). In Spain, by the
end of the 19th century, those sectors that had attracted most foreign capital
were already developed; the railways network was completed and mining
resources were fully exploited. Perhaps this fact helps explain why, in the
absence of new investment opportunities, international capital inflow into
Spain slowed down61. This is, no doubt, an avenue for further research.
To sum up, the idea that the suspension of the convertibility of the peseta in
1883 and its delayed effect in terms of a currency crash in the 1890s was the
result of endemic balance of payment problems is not supported by the evi-
dence presented here. On the contrary, it is the alternative view that sudden
stops, in a context of domestic financial imperfections, are to be blamed.
5. DID INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION HOLD BACK GROWTH?
The traditional view among Spanish economic historians, reinforced by
those who argue in terms of the «external constraint on growth» approach,
associates a current account deficit to a deterioration of the economic
situation or a threat to growth. Conversely, a current account reversal — that
is, a surplus on current account — will imply, according to the sudden stop
literature, a decline in investment and, thus, in economic growth that tends
to intensify if the country is less opened (Edwards 2004; Bordo et al. 2010).
No consensus has been reached on the importance of a large and resilient
current account deficit for growth. The optimistic view emphasizes the
intertemporal nature of the current account arguing that to the extent they
reflect a rise in investment there is no reason for concern (Sachs 1981;
Corden 1994). The opposite, pessimistic view, epitomized in Thirlwall’s
approach (1979), has a more recent expression in Fischer (1988) to whom the
first sign of a crisis is the current account deficit. In this context of uncer-
tainty, historical research can make a useful contribution.
How did the interruption of foreign capital inflow affect economic growth
in Spain?
61 As from the beginning of the 20th century, investments in public utilities (electricity and gas)
and, later, financial investments (Sarda´ Dexeus 1948, p. 268) were to become more significant. See
the British investments in these sectors for the period up to 1914 in Stone (1999).
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Let us begin with the current account identity:
CAB ¼ X  M þ NCT þ NY ¼ S  I; ð1Þ
where CAB is the current account balance; X and M are exports and imports of
goods and services, respectively; NCT is the net current transfers; and NY is the
net income from abroad, while CAB equals the difference between gross
domestic saving (S) and investment (I)62. Here, we can normalize regarding
GDP (Y), to provide an idea of the relative size of each item,
CAB=Y ¼ S=Y  I=Y ð2Þ
Two distinctive phases can be observed in the relationship between invest-
ment and saving with 1890 as the turning point (Figure 14). Domestic invest-
ment was above saving between 1850 and 1890, which means that the foreign
capital supplemented the domestic saving to meet investment demand. The gap
between investment and saving was particularly noticeable from 1850 to 1866.
This upsurge of investment that reached 10 per cent of GDP in the early 1860s
was associated to the construction of the railways network in which foreign
FIGURE 14
GROSS INVESTMENT AND SAVING (% GDP)
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Sources: Investment, Prados de la Escosura (2003); saving, see the text.
62 If we start from the basic national account identity, GDP5C1G1 I1X2M, where C and G
are private and Government consumptions; I, gross domestic investment and X and M are exports
and import of goods and services, respectively. We, then, define the current account balance (CAB)
as, CAB5X2M1NCT1NY, and the Gross National Product as GNP5C1G1 I1CAB. We can
derive gross domestic saving as S5GNP2C2G. Thus, S5 I1CAB, so CAB5S2 I.
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capital played a non-negligible role. From 1890 up to the eve of the World War I,
investment depended almost exclusively on domestic saving as a current
account surplus prevailed (exception made of the years 1899-1904). All in all,
investment and saving followed the same trend with investment remaining
below 8 per cent of GDP up to 1898, but for the years of the railway con-
struction boom.
The small size of investment and saving, in terms of GDP, hides the relative
importance of foreign investment within the gross domestic capital formation
in Spain. Starting from expression (2), we can decompose gross domestic
investment into gross domestic saving (private, Sp/Y, and Government, Sg/Y,
saving) and the (negative of the) current account balance (Figure 15).
I=Y ¼ S=Y  CAB=Y ¼ Sp=Y þ Sg=Y  CAB=Y ð3Þ
Government saving was negative up to 1891, especially between 1861 and
1873, and was not counterbalanced by a rise in private saving but by a current
account deficit financed through a net inflow of foreign capital. This way, the
decrease in government saving did not imply a constraint to the investment
ratio. An implication is that a decline of investment derived from a decrease in
government saving — the crowding-out hypothesis sometimes discussed in the
literature — is not confirmed by the evidence.
FIGURE 15
DECOMPOSING GROSS INVESTMENT: PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT SAVING
AND THE (NEGATIVE OF THE) CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% GDP)
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Sources: Government Saving, Comı´n and Dı´az Fuentes (2005); for the rest, see the text.
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The relative importance of the net capital inflow contribution to capital
formation is captured by its share of gross investment (Figure 16). Between
1850 and 1890, foreign capital financed the one-fifth of the domestic invest-
ment, reaching, on average, almost the two-fifths of it during the third quarter of
the 19th century. Conversely, in the years 1891-1913, the net outflow of capital
implied a contraction of domestic investment (13 per cent) that reached nearly
the one-third over 1891-1898, but experienced a reversal episode over 1899-
1904, in which the net inflow of foreign capital represented 15 per cent of the
gross capital formation.
These are far from negligible figures, but how large was the impact of net
capital inflow on economic growth? I have used a growth-accounting fra-
mework to investigate how much would the capital stock have varied, if
investment demand had been met exclusively through domestic saving, and,
then, how much would have the GDP per head differed63.
The absence of net inflow of foreign capital is simulated by replacing
actual investment with saving in the estimates of capital stock64. It could be
argued that foreign capital was invested in non-residential structures,
FIGURE 16
NET CAPITAL INFLOW AS A PROPORTION OF GROSS INVESTMENT (%)
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63 I have used the same database and accounting framework employed in Prados de la Escosura
and Rose´s (2009, 2010).
64 In the simulations, I distributed the difference between investment and saving proportionally
among the different type of assets.
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machinery and transport equipment to larger extent than in residential struc-
tures. This option has not been explored here, but it can be presumed that the
results from this counterfactual exercise provide only a lower-bound estimate.
Furthermore, we could speculate that the investment by nationals would have
been lower without the stimulus of foreign investment, and the employment
would have been lower without this increase in capital formation.
A comparison between actual and counterfactual capital stock is provided
in Figure 17. Over the period 1850-1890, the counterfactual level of capital
stock is lower and its pace of growth milder than the actual one (3.1 against
3.4 per cent), especially during years of intensive capital inflow such as those
of the railway construction (2.9 vs. 4.9 per cent). As regards the years 1891-
1913, the question is how larger the capital stock would have been, if all
saving would have been invested domestically, that is, without a net outflow
of capital. In such a scenario, the actual capital stock would be smaller and
its growth is slower than the counterfactual one (2.5 vs. 2.8 per cent), and
even more during the sudden stops of the 1890s (1.9 vs. 2.9 per cent).
Next, the impact on the growth of GDP per head has been assessed by
comparing the actual and counterfactual scenarios. The simulation exercise
provides once again the lower-bound estimates, as foreign capital inflow is
assumed to have an impact on capital accumulation, but not on the efficiency
in the use of production factors. Nonetheless, the new technology embodied
in machinery and transport equipment financed by foreign investment would
have improved efficiency and, thus, increased the total factor productivity.
FIGURE 17
ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL CAPITAL STOCK, 1850-1913 (18505 100)
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Source: see the text.
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This would be especially the case during the railway construction and the
mining boom of the third quarter of the 19th century65.
Actual and counterfactual growth rates of GDP per head over distinctive
phases of the economic performance are offered in Table 166. Two different
phases are considered that correspond to the long swings in Spanish economic
growth, 1850-1883 and 1884-1913 (Prados de la Escosura 2007)67. In the first one,
per capita GDP would have grown at a slightly lower rate in the counterfactual
scenario of the lack of a net inflow of foreign capital. The differential increases
during the railway construction. In the post-1884 years, the counterfactual sce-
nario of the absence of a net outflow of capital produces a faster pace of growth.
This is more intense during sudden stops, particularly in those of the 1890s.
The results of this highly tentative and speculative exercise help to highlight
the significance of Spain’s openness and integration in the international capital
market. Economic growth intensified during the late 19th century, as foreign
capital complemented domestic saving to meet a growing investment demand
and, although difficult to quantify, improvements in the quality of capital and
embodied technology in new capital goods, whose acquisition was funded by
foreign capital, most probably made the economy more efficient. Conversely,
TABLE 1
ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL GROWTH (%)
Capital stock GDP per head
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
Simulation 1
1850-1883 3.6 3.0 1.4 1.3
1850-1866 4.9 2.9 1.1 0.8
1850-1873 3.9 2.5 1.7 1.4
Simulation 2
1884-1913 2.4 2.7 0.6 0.7
1891-1898 1.9 2.9 0.9 1.1
1906-1913 2.8 3.2 1.8 2.0
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2009, 2010), and see the text.
65 See Herranz-Lonca´n’s (2006) important contribution on the impact of railways on capital
accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
66 In the simulation, I should have previously adjusted the share of capital in national income
resulting from a lower capital stock in the growth-accounting exercise, with the subsequent
reduction in the growth rate of GDP. However, as I am trying to obtain a lower-bound estimate,
I have not considered this option.
67 Alternative simulations for 1850-1890 and 1891-1913 cast similar results with counterfactual
per capita GDP growth being lower than actual growth in the first period (0.9 vs. 1.0 per cent) and
higher in the second (1.2 vs. 1.0).
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the sudden stops at the turn of the century slowed down the growth, as the
increase in capital accumulation decelerated, and presumably the efficiency of
the economy. Thus, sudden stops by causing current account reversals and
currency drops in a context of domestic macroeconomic imperfections had a
clear negative effect on the long-run growth of Spain.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In 1850-1890, the economic expansion coincided with a significant cur-
rent account deficit, whereas in 1891-1913, the growth slowed down at the
time of positive current account balances. This inverse correlation between
current account surplus and economic growth throws serious doubts on the
widespread view of an external restriction to Spain’s growth during the 19th
century. It suggests, in fact, an alternative interpretation — the balance of
payments reacted to changes in the equilibrium between saving and invest-
ment. Thus, the current account deficit resulted from an inflow of capital that
allowed the rate of investment to rise and, in turn, to contribute to more
rapid growth. Only when isolation from the international economy
increased, since 1891, investment demand had to rely on domestic saving. In
the context of globalization that characterized the classical gold standard
era, there was no reason why an open economy should not enjoy sustained
access to international capital markets and break the link between invest-
ment and domestic saving. From this perspective, the persistence of the
current account deficit between 1850 and 1890 is better understood.
At the turn of the century, domestic macroeconomic imperfections
strengthened the current account reversals that had been provoked by sudden
stops, undermining the confidence of foreign investors in the Spanish economy
and helping the flight of foreign capital. Furthermore, as Blanca Sa´nchez-
Alonso (2000) has shown, the migration push of the 1891 protectionist tariff was
largely offset by the microeconomic consequences of the currency crash pre-
venting individuals from migrating for one and a half decades.
The view that Spanish integration in international markets contributed to a
slowing down of economic growth appears to be wrong. It can be suggested that
without the current account deficit — that is, without an inflow of foreign
capital — Spain would have grown at a slower speed during the second half the
19th century. As the inflow of capital dried up, investment had to rely exclusively
on domestic savings’ slowing down capital accumulation and economic growth.
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APPENDIX 1
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT, NET CAPITAL INFLOW AND INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS, 1850-1913 (MILLION PESETAS)
Export
goods
f.o.b.
Export
services*
Payments to
domestic
Labor
Current
transfers
Imports
goods
f.o.b.
Imports
services*
Payments
to Foreign
Capital
Commodity
balance
Balance of
services*
Net income
from
abroad
Net current
transfers
Current
account
balance
Variation
in reserves
Net
Capital
inflow
International
indebtedness
1850 161.9 8.2 0.2 4.2 169.5 16.6 55.9 27.6 28.4 255.7 4.2 267.4 24.0 91.4 1596.4
1851 142.8 8.4 0.2 4.2 182.1 18.8 49.2 239.3 210.3 249.0 4.2 294.5 9.0 103.5 1699.9
1852 134.6 8.8 0.2 4.3 194.1 18.3 51.3 259.5 29.5 251.0 4.3 2115.8 8.0 123.8 1823.7
1853 185.9 12.8 0.3 5.3 198.0 22.1 47.7 212.1 29.3 247.4 5.3 263.6 10.0 73.6 1897.3
1854 229.5 16.4 0.3 6.1 217.5 31.4 47.8 12.0 215.0 247.5 6.1 244.4 31.0 75.4 1972.6
1855 322.0 16.4 0.3 6.4 237.0 40.9 43.3 85.0 224.5 243.0 6.4 24.0 45.0 21.0 1993.7
1856 319.4 20.4 0.4 7.1 291.9 57.0 42.2 27.5 236.6 241.8 7.1 243.9 51.0 94.9 2088.6
1857 318.1 22.5 0.5 8.0 337.0 76.5 40.7 219.0 253.9 240.2 8.0 2105.2 34.0 139.2 2227.7
1858 179.9 18.9 0.5 8.0 345.4 69.8 43.9 2165.5 250.9 243.4 8.0 2251.8 18.0 269.8 2497.5
1859 236.9 15.3 0.5 8.4 297.0 49.5 45.8 260.1 234.2 245.3 8.4 2131.1 56.0 187.1 2684.6
1860 262.9 61.7 0.5 8.6 308.5 52.2 51.6 245.7 9.4 251.1 8.6 278.8 63.0 141.8 2826.4
1861 281.0 35.1 0.5 8.6 325.8 51.7 50.1 244.8 216.5 249.6 8.6 2102.4 104.0 206.4 3032.8
1862 235.0 20.0 0.8 9.9 360.9 59.2 55.9 2125.9 239.2 255.1 9.9 2210.3 79.0 289.3 3322.1
1863 236.9 21.9 0.7 9.5 443.0 71.3 51.2 2206.1 249.5 250.4 9.5 2296.5 52.0 348.5 3670.6
1864 219.9 33.1 0.8 9.8 427.9 75.4 72.8 2208.0 242.4 272.1 9.8 2312.7 116.0 428.7 4099.3
1865 250.2 22.4 0.8 10.5 381.5 60.5 51.8 2131.3 238.1 251.0 10.5 2210.0 73.0 283.0 4382.2
1866 267.0 21.1 0.9 12.7 380.3 59.6 67.9 2113.4 238.5 266.9 12.7 2206.1 57.0 263.1 4645.3
1867 367.4 19.9 1.0 13.4 299.9 48.5 66.4 67.5 228.6 265.4 13.4 213.1 72.0 85.1 4730.5
1868 374.4 23.7 1.0 14.6 343.3 65.4 83.3 31.1 241.7 282.3 14.6 278.3 42.0 120.3 4850.8
1869 429.3 21.9 1.2 16.9 304.5 52.8 113.5 124.8 230.9 2112.3 16.9 21.4 68.0 69.4 4920.2
1870 334.2 21.1 1.2 17.3 322.7 53.0 113.2 11.5 231.9 2112.1 17.3 2115.1 105.0 220.1 5140.3
1871 433.1 32.3 1.1 16.9 382.8 57.9 126.6 50.3 225.6 2125.5 16.9 283.9 83.0 166.9 5307.2
1872 493.2 29.8 1.7 19.4 479.5 68.1 137.6 13.7 238.4 2135.9 19.4 2141.1 96.0 237.1 5544.3
1873 582.5 33.4 2.1 22.1 406.5 55.9 140.1 176.0 222.5 2138.0 22.1 37.7 126.0 88.3 5632.6
1874 506.7 28.6 2.6 28.0 497.5 71.8 193.9 9.2 243.3 2191.3 28.0 2197.3 2367.6 2170.3 5462.4
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1875 537.9 26.6 2.4 25.9 423.4 60.0 191.9 114.6 233.4 2189.5 25.9 282.4 12.6 95.0 5557.4
1876 451.7 28.2 3.4 29.8 521.2 73.1 112.9 269.5 244.9 2109.5 29.8 2194.2 7.5 201.7 5759.0
1877 566.4 29.5 3.5 31.0 457.5 68.9 123.7 109.0 239.4 2120.2 31.0 219.7 25.8 13.9 5772.9
1878 534.2 29.6 1.6 25.1 433.1 69.0 126.4 101.1 239.3 2124.8 25.1 237.9 4.9 42.8 5815.7
1879 540.7 31.6 2.9 26.9 493.1 81.2 123.8 47.6 249.6 2120.9 26.9 296.0 221.2 74.8 5890.5
1880 734.5 39.5 3.1 26.3 502.9 86.3 136.2 231.6 246.8 2133.1 26.3 78.0 239.5 2117.5 5773.0
1881 755.6 42.8 1.7 24.7 575.9 93.7 173.0 179.7 250.9 2171.3 24.7 217.8 235.8 218.0 5754.9
1882 764.0 47.1 2.9 28.7 613.1 92.6 187.5 150.9 245.5 2184.6 28.7 250.5 38.1 88.6 5843.6
1883 831.1 31.7 2.8 31.8 650.2 90.6 208.7 181.0 258.9 2205.9 31.8 252.0 231.5 20.5 5864.1
1884 718.4 32.3 2.7 33.3 572.1 78.5 192.6 146.3 246.1 2189.9 33.3 256.4 210.8 45.6 5909.6
1885 760.0 35.6 3.1 29.3 579.6 72.2 199.2 180.4 236.6 2196.1 29.3 223.0 227.9 24.9 5904.8
1886 817.9 41.1 4.9 36.6 586.0 80.0 203.1 232.0 239.0 2198.2 36.6 31.4 230.2 261.6 5843.2
1887 753.2 44.1 5.0 47.5 565.9 84.2 193.1 187.2 240.1 2188.1 47.5 6.5 246.0 252.5 5790.7
1888 810.1 49.2 5.4 59.5 621.7 99.6 218.0 188.4 250.4 2212.7 59.5 215.2 227.8 212.6 5778.0
1889 834.3 57.0 5.9 84.1 693.0 113.8 217.3 141.2 256.8 2211.3 84.1 242.8 245.1 22.3 5775.8
1890 867.2 53.5 3.5 65.2 701.3 92.2 224.2 166.0 238.7 2220.8 65.2 228.3 211.0 17.3 5793.1
1891 933.7 50.6 4.6 76.3 669.0 91.2 214.0 264.8 240.6 2209.4 76.3 91.1 26.1 297.2 5695.9
1892 931.9 51.7 5.2 93.7 661.1 84.1 198.9 270.8 232.4 2193.7 93.7 138.4 232.7 2171.1 5524.9
1893 881.3 52.5 5.3 106.6 658.9 85.3 201.3 222.5 232.8 2196.0 106.6 100.3 219.9 2120.2 5404.7
1894 899.0 55.0 7.2 89.2 675.5 85.5 199.3 223.5 230.5 2192.1 89.2 90.1 24.9 295.0 5309.7
1895 861.8 47.8 3.9 65.7 574.3 67.5 191.9 287.4 219.7 2188.0 65.7 145.4 252.6 2198.0 5111.7
1896 1067.7 63.0 5.4 79.1 637.1 89.4 218.2 430.6 226.4 2212.8 79.1 270.5 27.6 2278.1 4833.6
1897 1127.0 72.4 5.2 88.1 689.4 95.6 246.2 437.6 223.2 2241.0 88.1 261.5 29.8 2271.3 4562.3
1898 1272.3 69.2 5.6 100.4 709.2 92.5 298.0 563.2 223.4 2292.4 100.4 347.8 291.8 256.0 4506.2
1899 1058.3 89.9 6.4 94.7 910.0 114.9 342.2 148.2 225.0 2335.8 94.7 2117.9 161.5 279.4 4785.6
1900 1181.1 129.4 6.9 104.2 1003.2 122.3 348.3 177.9 7.1 2341.4 104.2 252.2 28.1 44.1 4829.7
1901 1104.5 87.5 6.6 108.2 1053.6 99.6 291.7 50.9 212.1 2285.1 108.2 2138.2 228.6 109.6 4939.3
1902 1103.5 97.0 7.4 94.1 1006.7 88.7 295.1 96.7 8.2 2287.7 94.1 288.5 26.4 114.9 5054.2
1903 1152.0 103.9 8.0 108.7 1084.3 101.9 302.7 67.6 2.0 2294.7 108.7 2116.4 19.1 135.5 5189.7
1904 1202.0 104.7 11.2 145.7 1090.6 110.5 315.8 111.4 25.8 2304.6 145.7 253.3 39.0 92.3 5282.0
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Export
goods
f.o.b.
Export
services*
Payments to
domestic
Labor
Current
transfers
Imports
goods
f.o.b.
Imports
services*
Payments
to Foreign
Capital
Commodity
balance
Balance of
services*
Net income
from
abroad
Net current
transfers
Current
account
balance
Variation
in reserves
Net
Capital
inflow
International
indebtedness
1905 1318.5 125.1 12.5 180.0 1116.1 143.4 320.1 202.4 218.2 2307.6 180.0 56.5 3.7 252.8 5229.2
1906 1323.5 94.7 9.9 196.5 967.0 117.3 371.2 356.5 222.6 2361.2 196.5 169.2 20.8 2148.4 5080.8
1907 1405.1 86.7 9.3 217.2 956.2 112.5 412.4 448.9 225.8 2403.1 217.2 237.2 217.0 2254.2 4826.6
1908 1140.6 77.8 11.8 275.0 937.5 115.3 317.8 203.1 237.4 2306.0 275.0 134.7 20.3 2114.4 4712.2
1909 1120.8 78.2 9.7 279.2 854.5 103.4 324.9 266.3 225.2 2315.3 279.2 205.0 64.5 2140.5 4571.7
1910 1237.6 97.7 12.8 328.8 936.8 123.1 321.4 300.8 225.5 2308.6 328.8 295.5 21.4 2274.1 4297.6
1911 1377.8 104.4 12.7 339.9 1110.6 144.1 285.2 267.1 239.8 2272.4 339.9 294.8 6.1 2288.7 4008.9
1912 1490.7 129.3 17.2 395.8 1158.5 182.4 322.6 332.2 253.1 2305.4 395.8 369.5 81.1 2288.4 3720.5
1913 1524.3 135.4 15.9 370.3 1380.6 156.4 383.8 143.7 221.0 2367.9 370.3 125.1 28.0 297.1 3623.4
* Excluding factor payments.
Source: See text.
APPENDIX 2
INVESTMENT AND SAVING, 1850-1913 (MILLION PESETAS AND % GDP)
(Million Pesetas) (% GDP)
(% Gross
Investment)
Gross
investment
Current
account
balance
Gross
saving
Govern-
ment
saving
Private
saving
Net Capital
inflow
Gross
investment
Current
account
balance
Gross
saving
Government
saving
Private
saving
Net Capital
inflow
Current Account
Balance
(negative)
Net
Capital
inflow
1850 232.3 267.4 164.8 4.0 160.8 91.4 5.5 21.6 3.9 0.1 3.8 2.2 29.0 39.4
1851 258.3 294.5 163.8 227.0 190.8 103.5 5.9 22.2 3.8 20.6 4.4 2.4 36.6 40.1
1852 297.7 2115.8 181.9 210.0 191.9 123.8 6.8 22.6 4.2 20.2 4.4 2.8 38.9 41.6
1853 300.8 263.6 237.2 211.0 248.2 73.6 5.8 21.2 4.6 20.2 4.8 1.4 21.1 24.5
1854 264.3 244.4 220.0 227.0 247.0 75.4 5.0 20.8 4.1 20.5 4.6 1.4 16.8 28.5
1855 230.4 24.0 254.4 252.0 306.4 21.0 4.1 0.4 4.5 20.9 5.4 0.4 210.4 9.1
1856 304.3 243.9 260.4 266.0 326.4 94.9 5.4 20.8 4.7 21.2 5.8 1.7 14.4 31.2
1857 370.1 2105.2 264.9 254.0 318.9 139.2 6.9 21.9 4.9 21.0 5.9 2.6 28.4 37.6
1858 513.2 2251.8 261.4 242.0 303.4 269.8 9.8 24.8 5.0 20.8 5.8 5.1 49.1 52.6
1859 539.9 2131.1 408.8 6.0 402.8 187.1 9.6 22.3 7.3 0.1 7.2 3.3 24.3 34.7
1860 642.2 278.8 563.4 265.0 628.4 141.8 10.8 21.3 9.5 21.1 10.5 2.4 12.3 22.1
1861 588.0 2102.4 485.7 2131.0 616.7 206.4 9.7 21.7 8.0 22.2 10.1 3.4 17.4 35.1
1862 632.1 2210.3 421.8 2130.0 551.8 289.3 10.1 23.4 6.7 22.1 8.8 4.6 33.3 45.8
1863 617.4 2296.5 320.9 2121.0 441.9 348.5 9.4 24.5 4.9 21.8 6.7 5.3 48.0 56.4
1864 548.2 2312.7 235.5 2186.0 421.5 428.7 8.3 24.8 3.6 22.8 6.4 6.5 57.0 78.2
1865 464.9 2210.0 255.0 2139.0 394.0 283.0 7.5 23.4 4.1 22.2 6.4 4.6 45.2 60.9
1866 458.9 2206.1 252.8 2101.0 353.8 263.1 6.9 23.1 3.8 21.5 5.3 4.0 44.9 57.3
1867 482.6 213.1 469.5 2118.0 587.5 85.1 6.8 20.2 6.6 21.7 8.3 1.2 2.7 17.6
1868 275.1 278.3 196.8 2149.0 345.8 120.3 4.6 21.3 3.3 22.5 5.8 2.0 28.5 43.7
1869 264.0 21.4 262.6 2270.0 532.6 69.4 4.8 0.0 4.8 24.9 9.7 1.3 0.5 26.3
1870 313.4 2115.1 198.3 2331.0 529.3 220.1 5.2 21.9 3.3 25.5 8.9 3.7 36.7 70.2
1871 367.1 283.9 283.2 2238.0 521.2 166.9 5.7 21.3 4.4 23.7 8.1 2.6 22.9 45.5
1872 413.4 2141.1 272.3 2219.0 491.3 237.1 5.6 21.9 3.7 23.0 6.7 3.2 34.1 57.4
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(Million Pesetas) (% GDP)
(% Gross
Investment)
Gross
investment
Current
account
balance
Gross
saving
Govern-
ment
saving
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saving
Net Capital
inflow
Gross
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Current
account
balance
Gross
saving
Government
saving
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saving
Net Capital
inflow
Current Account
Balance
(negative)
Net
Capital
inflow
1873 374.3 37.7 411.9 2227.0 638.9 88.3 4.8 0.5 5.3 22.9 8.2 1.1 210.1 23.6
1874 423.2 2197.3 225.9 210.0 235.9 2170.3 5.4 22.5 2.9 20.1 3.0 22.2 46.6 240.2
1875 424.6 282.4 342.2 2111.0 453.2 95.0 5.5 21.1 4.4 21.4 5.9 1.2 19.4 22.4
1876 526.2 2194.2 332.0 6.0 326.0 201.7 6.6 22.4 4.1 0.1 4.1 2.5 36.9 38.3
1877 532.0 219.7 512.3 213.0 525.3 13.9 6.0 20.2 5.8 20.1 6.0 0.2 3.7 2.6
1878 628.4 237.9 590.5 230.0 620.5 42.8 7.2 20.4 6.8 20.3 7.1 0.5 6.0 6.8
1879 479.9 296.0 383.9 278.0 461.9 74.8 5.6 21.1 4.5 20.9 5.4 0.9 20.0 15.6
1880 595.2 78.0 673.2 258.0 731.2 2117.5 6.6 0.9 7.5 20.6 8.1 21.3 213.1 219.7
1881 503.7 217.8 486.0 21.0 487.0 218.0 5.3 20.2 5.1 0.0 5.2 20.2 3.5 23.6
1882 612.7 250.5 562.1 31.0 531.1 88.6 6.1 20.5 5.6 0.3 5.3 0.9 8.2 14.5
1883 712.9 252.0 660.8 245.0 705.8 20.5 7.0 20.5 6.5 20.4 6.9 0.2 7.3 2.9
1884 682.0 256.4 625.7 228.0 653.7 45.6 7.0 20.6 6.4 20.3 6.7 0.5 8.3 6.7
1885 490.5 223.0 467.5 282.0 549.5 24.9 5.1 20.2 4.8 20.9 5.7 20.1 4.7 21.0
1886 444.2 31.4 475.6 215.0 490.6 261.6 4.5 0.3 4.8 20.2 5.0 20.6 27.1 213.9
1887 420.8 6.5 427.3 273.0 500.3 252.5 4.7 0.1 4.8 20.8 5.6 20.6 21.5 212.5
1888 386.0 215.2 370.8 2122.0 492.8 212.6 4.1 20.2 3.9 21.3 5.2 20.1 3.9 23.3
1889 438.4 242.8 395.6 267.0 462.6 22.3 5.0 20.5 4.5 20.8 5.3 0.0 9.8 20.5
1890 488.8 228.3 460.5 250.0 510.5 17.3 5.5 20.3 5.2 20.6 5.8 0.2 5.8 3.5
1891 472.6 91.1 563.7 254.0 617.7 297.2 5.2 1.0 6.3 20.6 6.9 21.1 219.3 220.6
1892 485.7 138.4 624.1 219.0 643.1 2171.1 5.4 1.5 7.0 20.2 7.2 21.9 228.5 235.2
1893 481.3 100.3 581.5 75.0 506.5 2120.2 5.5 1.2 6.7 0.9 5.8 21.4 220.8 225.0
1894 477.9 90.1 567.9 6.0 561.9 295.0 5.6 1.1 6.7 0.1 6.6 21.1 218.8 219.9
1895 523.9 145.4 669.3 226.0 695.3 2198.0 6.1 1.7 7.8 20.3 8.1 22.3 227.8 237.8
1896 524.3 270.5 794.8 40.0 754.8 2278.1 6.4 3.3 9.7 0.5 9.2 23.4 251.6 253.0
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1897 564.5 261.5 826.0 254.0 880.0 2271.3 6.3 2.9 9.3 20.6 9.9 23.0 246.3 248.1
1898 599.4 347.8 947.2 8.0 939.2 256.0 6.3 3.6 9.9 0.1 9.8 20.6 258.0 29.3
1899 894.1 2117.9 776.2 134.0 642.2 279.4 9.2 21.2 8.0 1.4 6.6 2.9 13.2 31.2
1900 1150.2 252.2 1098.0 52.0 1046.0 44.1 11.2 20.5 10.7 0.5 10.2 0.4 4.5 3.8
1901 893.5 2138.2 755.3 38.0 717.3 109.6 8.3 21.3 7.0 0.4 6.7 1.0 15.5 12.3
1902 773.1 288.5 684.6 71.0 613.6 114.9 7.4 20.8 6.6 0.7 5.9 1.1 11.5 14.9
1903 844.3 2116.4 728.0 23.0 705.0 135.5 7.6 21.0 6.5 0.2 6.3 1.2 13.8 16.0
1904 905.9 253.3 852.6 54.0 798.6 92.3 7.7 20.5 7.3 0.5 6.8 0.8 5.9 10.2
1905 808.4 56.5 864.9 72.0 792.9 252.8 7.1 0.5 7.6 0.6 7.0 20.5 27.0 26.5
1906 849.4 169.2 1018.6 103.0 915.6 2148.4 7.3 1.5 8.8 0.9 7.9 21.3 219.9 217.5
1907 978.8 237.2 1216.0 65.0 1151.0 2254.2 8.1 2.0 10.1 0.5 9.6 22.1 224.2 226.0
1908 929.3 134.7 1063.9 56.0 1007.9 2114.4 7.8 1.1 8.9 0.5 8.4 21.0 214.5 212.3
1909 1015.9 205.0 1220.9 251.0 1271.9 2140.5 8.3 1.7 10.0 20.4 10.4 21.2 220.2 213.8
1910 1145.1 295.5 1440.7 26.0 1446.7 2274.1 9.8 2.5 12.3 20.1 12.4 22.3 225.8 223.9
1911 1245.7 294.8 1540.5 6.0 1534.5 2288.7 9.9 2.3 12.2 0.0 12.2 22.3 223.7 223.2
1912 1493.7 369.5 1863.2 262.0 1925.2 2288.4 11.6 2.9 14.5 20.5 15.0 22.2 224.7 219.3
1913 1685.0 125.1 1810.1 271.0 1881.1 297.1 12.2 0.9 13.1 20.5 13.6 20.7 27.4 25.8
Sources: See the text and Appendix 1. GDP and Investment, Prados de la Escosura (2003); Public Saving, Comı´n and Dı´az Fuentes (2005).
